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SINKING THE UNPAID EXTERNSHIP: HOW MANY UNPAID EXTERNSHIPS VIOLATE THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT AND YIELD EXCEPTIONALLY BROAD JOINT LIABILITY
Hunter Swain1

INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, unpaid internships and externships–internships administered by
university programs through which interns can earn school credit–have become an increasingly
ubiquitous part of American university education, particularly for graduate students in law school
and business school. At some law schools, participation in an externship program has become a
de facto graduation requirement. Proponents of such programs tout them as a novel, highly useful
form of experiential learning that fills in the gaps left by traditional classroom education.2 To
those proponents, unpaid internships and externships are a critical tool for on-the-job training, and
they provide both necessary experience and an opportunity for students to demonstrate their skills
to prospective employers. However, critics of unpaid internships and externship programs
question the actual educational value of unpaid labor and view with skepticism the considerable
cost savings that such programs generate both for universities and for sponsoring employers.
The legality–and morality–of certain unpaid internships and university externship
programs is highly questionable, and the practice has begun to generate a substantial amount of
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J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 2013; B.A., The Colorado College, 2009. I wish to express my
heartfelt gratitude to Professor Scott Moss at the University of Colorado Law School for his insights and for his
ongoing encouragement and support. This Article is dedicated to all workers who do not receive a fair wage for
their work. All mistakes are the author’s alone.
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See generally, e.g., James H. Blackman, Practical Examples for Establishing an Externship Program Available to
Every Student, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2007); Michael A. Yarnell, An Externship Program: Start It, Grow It, Improve It, 3
PHOENIX L. REV. 473 (2010).
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litigation. For example, class-action lawsuits are pending against both Hearst Publications3 and
Fox Searchlight Pictures4 alleging that the companies violated the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act by illegally employing unpaid interns. Beyond these
recent lawsuits, unpaid internships for private-sector employers are a widespread, controversial
practice whose legality is at best unclear.
This Article argues that unpaid internships and externships for private-sector employers
are illegal because they violate the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938. More specifically, private-sector unpaid interns and externs are entitled to be paid a
minimum wage because they are statutory employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and all
employees are entitled to a minimum wage under the Act by default. This Article argues the
additional points, which to date have not been argued elsewhere, that (1) universities that place
externs in illegal unpaid externships are jointly liable for unpaid wages, and (2) many individuals,
including university administrators and externship supervisors, are individually liable for the
unpaid minimum wages of student workers in their externship programs.
Part I describes the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
and explains why many unpaid interns and externs for private-sector entities qualify as covered
“employees” under the Act. Part I also both explains the Act’s legal mechanisms for paying fulltime students less than the minimum wage and identifies some circumstances under which unpaid
private-sector internships and externships do not violate the law.

3

Wang v. Hearst Corp., 1:12-cv-00793 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Jan. 31, 2012). See also Outten & Golden LLP, Hearst
Corporation Class Action Litigation, Unpaid Interns Lawsuit, http://unpaidinternslawsuit.com/hearst-corporation
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
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Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 1:11-cv-06784 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Sept. 27, 2011). See also Outten & Golden LLP,
Fox Searchlight Class Action Litigation, Unpaid Interns Lawsuit, http://unpaidinternslawsuit.com/fox-searchlight
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
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Part II explains that the scope of FLSA liability for the unpaid minimum wages of privatesector unpaid interns and externs is extraordinarily broad. Other scholarship and lawsuits have
argued that the employers of unpaid interns and externs are FLSA-liable; Part II contributes the
following two previously ignored FLSA liabilities. First, universities that place externs in illegal
unpaid externships may be jointly liable for unpaid wages both as joint employers and as thirdparty employers who directly cause violations of the Act. Second, individual university
administrators may be individually liable for the unpaid minimum wages of externs who
participate in the university externship programs that they oversee. Given that FLSA liability can
reach into academia, schools sponsoring unpaid externships may ultimately receive less of a
bargain than they had assumed.
I.

MANY UNPAID EXTERNSHIPS VIOLATE THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19385 (“the FLSA” or “the Act”) comprehensively

regulates the wages of employees to whom the Act applies.6 Originally intended to alleviate
oppressive working conditions,7 the New Deal-Era statute imposes a number of requirements
upon employers, including the requirement that many employees be paid “time-and-a-half”

5

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–219 (West 2012).
The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements apply only to employees “in industries engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” id. § 202(a), and only to employers with gross sales or
revenue of at least $500,000, id. § 203(s)(1). Most businesses qualify: the United States Supreme Court currently
employs a broad interpretation of “engaged in commerce”; and even most small businesses have revenue (not
profits) in a gross (not net) volume above $500,000 (e.g., a solo-practice lawyer would have to bill barely 1500
hours at $350 hourly to exceed that threshold, and almost any small store netting just $100,000 in income almost
surely generated over $500,000 gross revenue because profit margins above 20% are not common). Accordingly,
the remainder of this Article assumes that the employers discussed herein are among the vast majority deemed to
be “engaged in commerce.”
7
Id. § 202. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-260 (Sept. 26, 1989), 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 696–97 (recounting President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s May 24, 1937, statement to Congress regarding the nascent FLSA that “[a] self-supporting and selfrespecting democracy can plead no justification for the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling
workers' wages or stretching workers' hours,” and that “[a]ll but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to
conserve our primary resources of manpower, Government must have some control over maximum hours,
minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the exploitation of unorganized labor”)
6
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overtime wages for any hours over forty worked in one week,8 restrictions upon the employment
of children,9 and a minimum hourly wage.10 This Part first describes which workers are covered
as “employees” under the FLSA. Second, this Part explains the mechanism by which employers
may legally pay students less than minimum wage. Third, this Part explains the narrow
exemptions from the Act’s protections for volunteer work, vocational training, and bona fide
educational externships that do not substantially benefit the employer. Finally, this Part argues
that the vast majority of externships at private-sector employers fail to fall within any of the
FLSA’s narrow exemptions, and therefore violate the Act’s minimum wage protections by
illegally taking advantage of unpaid labor.
A. Who is an Employee under the FLSA?
Because the FLSA aims to correct oppressive working conditions, its coverage is
extraordinarily broad, and the terms “employ,” “employee,” and “employer” as defined under the
Act encompass a significantly larger swath of working relationships than the traditional common
law definitions of the terms do. Under the FLSA, “employee” is defined somewhat circularly as
“any individual employed by an employer,”11 but “employ” is defined simply, and notably
broadly, as “to suffer or permit to work.”12 Furthermore, under the FLSA, “‘employer’ includes
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.”13 The FLSA’s purposefully broad and general definitions of these terms converge to
give the Act’s protections an extraordinarily large scope.
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Id.
Id. § 212.
10
Id. § 206(a).
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Id. § 203(e)(1).
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Id. § 203(g).
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Id. § 203(d) (emphasis added).
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The exceptionally expansive scope of the employer-employee relationship under the
FLSA has been repeatedly recognized both by the United States Supreme Court and by numerous
Courts of Appeals. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the Supreme Court contrasted
the definition of “employee” under the FLSA with definitions of the term under other statutes,
such as ERISA, the National Labor Relations Act (“the NLRA”), and the Social Security Act
(“the SSA”), noting the comparatively “striking breadth” of the term under the FLSA.14 In that
case, the Court also noted that the FLSA, “whose striking breadth we have previously noted,
stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a
strict application of traditional agency law principles.”15 Additionally, Courts of Appeals,
acknowledging the Supreme Court’s emphatically broad interpretation of the FLSA’s definitions,
consistently interpret the terms of the Act expansively in accordance with the “remedial nature of
the statute[, which] warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions so that they will have
‘the widest possible impact in the national economy.’”16 Because courts interpret the definitions
of “employer,” “employee,” and “employ” broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act,
the scope of the employer-employee relationship is uniquely expansive in the FLSA context and
is not constrained by traditional common-law agency definitions of the terms.
Just as employee status under the FLSA is not constrained by traditional common-law
definitions of the terms, neither is it limited by contractual terminology designed to bring a
particular relationship outside the scope of the Act’s minimum wage protections. In fact, rather
14

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–26 (1992)
Id. at 325 (internal citation omitted). Such agency principles, which govern the scope of the employment
relationship under other statutes, are significantly narrower. However, the remainder of this Article discusses the
terms “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” only as defined under the FLSA.
16
Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Comm. Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)). See also Wallington v. Rutherford Food. Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946) (“[T]he
definitive provisions of the [FLSA] are extremely comprehensive in their sweep.”) (emphasis added); Zheng v.
Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This is ‘the broadest definition of “employ” that has even been
included in any one act.’”) (quoting U.S. v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945)) (other citations and
alterations omitted).
15
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than rely upon common law definitions of control or upon the terms of a contract to determine
whether an individual is an employee under the FLSA, courts employ an “economic reality” test,
which examines the actual working relationship between the parties. In NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, the Supreme Court first adopted the economic reality test to determine employee
status under the NLRA, simultaneously rejecting the “right to control” test that separated
employees from independent contractors at common law.17 The Court reasoned that because the
NLRA was designed to alleviate industrial strife and inequality of bargaining power in labor
relations, employee status should be evaluated with a view toward the statute’s purposes, and
concluded that a relationship should come under the statute’s protections when “the economic
facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than of independent business
enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislation.”18
Shortly thereafter, in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,19 the Court first applied the
economic reality test in the FLSA context, outright rejecting the same common-law right-tocontrol test rejected in the NLRA context three years earlier in Hearst Publications. Rutherford
Food Corp. concerned a group of “beef boners”20 who worked at a cattle slaughterhouse.21
Because the employer slaughterhouse had contractually labeled the beef boners as independent
contractors, who are exempt from the FLSA’s protections, most of the boners worked well over
the maximum hours prescribed by the FLSA for a standard workweek without overtime pay.22
Moreover, the employer did not maintain records of the hours worked by the boners.23 In response,

17

NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 126–29 (1944) [hereinafter Hearst Publications].
Id. at 128.
19
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–31 (1947) [hereinafter Rutherford Food Corp.].
20
A “beef boner” is a specialized type of butcher who removes the bones from cattle carcasses during the
industrial production of beef. See id. at 724–26.
21
Id.
22
Wallington v. Rutherford Food. Corp., 156 F.2d at 515.
23
Id.
18
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the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (“the Division”)
brought an action to enjoin the employer slaughterhouse’s continued violations of the FLSA,
arguing that the beef boners had been improperly classified as independent contractors when they
were, in fact, employees.24 The district court held that the beef boners were not employees of the
slaughterhouse,25 but the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the beef boners were employees, in
part because the shop steward heavily supervised their work and the slaughterhouse provided their
uniforms and tools.26 The Circuit reasoned that “in doubtful situations, coverage is to be
determined broadly by reference to the underlying economic realities rather than by traditional
rules governing legal classifications of . . . employer and independent contractor.”27 The Supreme
Court affirmed, cementing economic reality as the primary test to determine employee status
under the FLSA.28
The Supreme Court further explained the economic reality test’s factors in a companion
case, United States v. Silk, which concerned whether coal workers were employees under the
Social Security Act.29 Silk found that the workers were employees, rather than independent
contractors,30 and considered the following factors relevant to a determination of employee status
under the economic reality test: (1) the degree of control exercised over the worker’s actions by
the employer, (2) the relative investment in facilities by the worker and the employer, (3) the
relative opportunity for profit and loss between the two, (4) the permanency of the relationship,

24

Id. at 514, 516.
Id. at 516.
26
Id. at 515–16.
27
Id. at 516.
28
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. at 730–31. The Court also added, unequivocally, that “[the FLSA]
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons and working
relationships which, prior to this Act, were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.” Id. at 728–
29.
29
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 705–06 (1947).
30
Id. at 716–17.
25
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and (5) the skill required to perform the worker’s job.31 Some other courts have also considered
an additional factor, (6) whether the service rendered by the worker is an integral part of the
employer’s business operations.32
The economic reality test is the established way to determine “employee” status under the
Act. The next Section discusses the relevant law with respect to employee status and exemptions
from the minimum wage requirement for full-time students, vocational trainees, volunteers, and
unpaid interns and externs.
B. Many Unpaid Internships and Externships for Private Employers Violate the FLSA
The preceding Section established that employee status under the FLSA is determined
neither by traditional common-law definitions nor by contractual terminology or the
characterizations of the parties. Rather, employee status under the FLSA and the applicability of
its minimum wage protections depend on the economic reality of the relationship between the
parties. By default, every statutory employee is entitled to be paid minimum wage under the Act,
subject to some per se exemptions inapplicable here.33 However, Department of Labor guidelines
and Supreme Court decisions interpreting the scope of the FLSA’s protections have made
exceptions to the FLSA’s blanket minimum wage guarantee for volunteers, vocational trainees,
some interns and externs who work in a bona fide educational environment and do not
substantially benefit their employers, and full-time student labor. This Section first briefly
31

Id. at 716.
See, e.g., Baystate v. Alternative Staffing, Inc., 163 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1998); Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., 757
F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); Secretary v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied sub nom. Lauritzen v. McLauthlin, 488 U.S. 898 (1987); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989);
Freund v. Hi-Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 F. App’x. 782 (11th Cir. 2006).
33
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)–(g). For a non-exhaustive list of occupations exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage
protections in more easily digestible form, see Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen75.asp (last visited November 20, 2012). Despite the odd specificity of
some of the occupational exemptions, like wreathmakers, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(d), babysitters, id. § 213(a)(15), and
computer programmers, id. § 213(a)(17), interns or those otherwise working either primarily or incidentally for
educational benefit are not exempted altogether, and almost none would fall within the jobs or industries
exempted by the Act.
32

9

explains the exclusive mechanism by which the wages of full-time student employees may
lawfully fall below the standard minimum wage. Second, this Section explains the Supreme
Court’s exemption from the FLSA for volunteer labor and vocational trainees, and argues that
unpaid externs are neither. Third, this Section explains the narrow range of circumstances under
which unpaid internships may be lawfully exempted from the FLSA’s minimum wages
guarantees. Finally, this Section argues that unpaid internships and externships for private-sector
employers do not fit within any of the FLSA’s exemptions and thus violate its minimum wage
provisions.
1. Statutory Mechanism for Lower Minimum Wage for Full-time Students
The FLSA provides a statutory mechanism by which employers may reduce a full-time
student’s wages below the standard minimum wage:34 29 U.S.C. § 214(b) allows employers to
reduce the wages of full-time students in certain industries to 85% of the minimum wage.35 The
covered industries able to use this provision are narrow: retail or service establishments;
agriculture; or institutions of higher learning where the students are enrolled.36 Further, before
employing any full-time students at subminimum wages, an employer must apply to the
appropriate regional administrator of the Division for a certificate authorizing the employer to pay
subminimum wages.37 Section 214’s subminimum wage reduction mechanism thus is rarely
applicable. It is relevant to this Article’s argument only insofar as its very existence illustrates that
34

29 U.S.C. § 214.
Id. § 214(b). The section actually allows employers to reduce the minimum wage to the greater of either (1)
$1.60 per hour or (2) 85% of the current general minimum wage. Id. The current federal minimum wage as of
publication is $7.25 per hour, 85% of which will always be greater than $1.60 per hour. See Minimum Wage, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm#.ULPvoYc818E (last visited November 26,
2012).
36
Specifically, section 214(b) allows for the reduction of wages of a full-time student employed by a retail or
service establishment, id. § 214(b)(1)(A), engaged in agriculture, id. § 214(b)(2), or employed by an institution of
higher learning where the student is enrolled, id. § 214(b)(3).
37
29 C.F.R. § 519.3(a). See also id. § 519.4(a)(2) (an application for a certificate to pay subminimum wages to fulltime students must be submitted “not later than the start of such employment”); id. § 519.6(a) (certificates will
not be issued retroactively).
35
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failure to pay full-time student employees any wage at all is clearly a violation of the FLSA’s
minimum wage provisions. Because the section allows employers to reduce the minimum wages
of their full-time student employees to 85% of the minimum wage at the least, it is axiomatic that
there is no plenary “student” exception that allows an employer to reduce a student worker’s
wages to zero.
2. Volunteer Labor and Vocational Training Are Exempted from the
FLSA’s Minimum Wage Guarantees
Although the definition of “employee” under the FLSA is extraordinarily broad, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that certain categories of working relationships do not fall
within the employer-employee category, and therefore are not subject to the Act’s minimum wage
guarantees. The primary exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court are (1) “those who, without
any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the
premises of another,”38 also known as vocational trainees, and (2) volunteers. This Section
describes the two seminal Supreme Court cases that limited the scope of the FLSA’s uniquely
expansive definition of “employ” to exclude those who use an employer’s resources strictly for
their own benefit and volunteers, Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.39 and Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,40 respectively.
In Portland Terminal Co., the Supreme Court reined in the FLSA’s uniquely expansive
definition of “employee” by clarifying that it “was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as
employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their
own advantage on the premises of another.”41 The case was a challenge to a railroad’s practice of

38

Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) [hereinafter Portland Terminal Co.].
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 148.
40
Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
41
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 152.
39
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offering unpaid “practical training to prospective yard brakemen” that lasted seven or eight
days.42 The railroad hired its brakemen only from a list it maintained of qualified workers, and
successful completion of the training program was a prerequisite to being included on the list.43
After successful completion of the program, each brakeman was given a retroactive daily
allowance of four dollars.44 The Division brought suit against the railroad company, arguing that
the railroad company’s practice violated the Act’s minimum wage provisions.45
The Supreme Court held that the practice did not violate the Act, and found especially
dispositive that the each worker’s “activities do not displace any of the regular employees, who
do most of the work themselves, and must stand immediately by to supervise whatever the
trainees do. The applicant's work does not expedite the company business, but may, and
sometimes does, actually impede and retard it.”46 The Court especially focused on the fact that the
employer received no immediate and material advantage from the work performed by the trainees,
contrasting the practice with a hypothetical situation where “an employer has evasively accepted
the services of beginners at pay less than the legal minimum without having obtained permits
from the administrator.”47 As discussed in Part II.B.3, infra, the Court’s reasoning for exempting
the railroad company’s training program in Portland Terminal Co. underlies the Department of
Labor’s entire policy about the applicability of the FLSA to unpaid interns and externs.
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Court acknowledged an
exemption from the FLSA for bona fide volunteers.48 The Division had brought suit against a

42

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 149.
46
Id. at 149–50.
47
Id. at 153.
48
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 291 (1985) [hereinafter Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation].
43
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private nonprofit religious organization for the unpaid minimum wages of the organization’s
“associates.”49 The organization ran several commercial businesses to finance its nonprofit
religious operations, and the associates were rehabilitated “drug addicts, derelicts, [and] criminals”
who worked for the organization’s commercial businesses in exchange for food, shelter, clothing,
and other benefits,50 but no wages.51 Notably, despite the protestations of the associates that they
were not employees and did not expect to be paid, the Supreme Court held that they were
statutory employees and therefore that the organization had violated the Act by failing to pay
them a minimum wage.52
In holding that the associates were employees under the Act, the Court emphasized the
economic reality test that it first applied in the FLSA context in Rutherford Food Corp.,5354 and
distinguished the associates from the brakemen in Portland Terminal Co., noting that the
associates were financially dependent on the organization for long periods of time, up to several
years.55 The Court held that a compensation agreement can be implied-in-fact and need not be
explicit or even acknowledged by the employee.56 In applying the economic reality test to find
that the associates were statutory employees, the Court insisted that a worker’s protestation that
she is not actually an employee entitled to minimum wages is entirely irrelevant, stating that “the
purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections.”57
The Court further explained that to allow the Foundation to employ its associates at substandard

49

Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 292.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 300–02. The Court also pointed out that the Act does not demand payment of wages in cash and that inkind wages may satisfy its requirement of payment of a minimum wage to employees. Id.
53
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947).
54
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Co-op, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947))).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 301 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)).
57
Id. at 302.
50
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wages would give it an unfair commercial advantage that the FLSA was intended to prevent.58
However, the Court expressly noted that bona fide volunteers are not employees under the Act,59
and it distinguished such actual volunteers from those who work voluntarily in otherwise
nonexempt positions for substandard pay in violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage protections.
Portland Terminal Co. and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation are the seminal decisions
that define the rough boundary among “those who, without any express or implied compensation
agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another,”60 bona fide
volunteers, and implied-in-fact employees who claim that they are volunteers but are actually
entitled to minimum wages under the Act. This Article argues that unpaid interns and externs who
work at private-sector businesses fall into the latter category, and are covered employees who are
entitled to be paid minimum wage despite their protestations to the contrary. The following
Section describes the Department of Labor’s advisory publications that attempt to clarify the
employee status of unpaid interns and externs under the FLSA.
3. Unpaid Internships and Externships Do Not Violate the FLSA Under
Certain Circumstances
Following the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that exempts both “those who, without any
express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises
of another” and bona fide volunteers from the FLSA’s minimum wage guarantees, the Wage and
Hour Division has recently distributed some advisory publications that clarify the employee status

58

Id. at 298–99.
“[There is no] reason to fear that, as petitioners assert, coverage of the Foundation's business activities will lead
to coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help remodel a church home
for the needy. The Act reaches only the ‘ordinary commercial activities’ of [exempt nonprofit] organizations, and
only those who engage in those activities in expectation of compensation. Ordinary volunteerism is not threatened
by this interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 302–03 (internal citations omitted).
60
Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. at 152.
59

14

of unpaid interns and externs under the FLSA.61 Although the Division’s advisory opinions and
fact sheets do not carry the full force of law of administrative regulations,62 they provide useful
guidance about the applicability of the FLSA’s minimum wage guarantees both to unpaid interns
and participants in university externship programs. Moreover, the Department of Labor considers
its opinion letters to be binding rulings,63 and the Supreme Court has deferred to the Department
of Labor’s interpretations of both the FLSA and the Department’s own regulations.64
In a 2006 opinion letter sent to a redacted party, the Wage and Hour Division responded to
a query whether participants in a university externship program were employees under the
FLSA.65 The program was organized as follows:
[T]he students spend one week “shadowing” an employee at a sponsoring employer. The students
are not compensated for time spent at the sponsoring employer, nor do they receive college credit
for their time. The purpose of the program is purely educational, and the sponsors invest
significant effort into designing experiences for the externs. The students do not generally perform
work for the employers, but may perform small office tasks or assist with a project. Because of the
short duration of the program, the sponsors do not derive any benefit from the externs’ labor, and
the externs do not displace any regular employees. . . . [T]he only benefit to the sponsor, aside
61

See, e.g., Wage and Hour Opinion Letter # FLSA2006-12, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Standards Admin., Wage and
Hour Div. (April 6, 2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_04_06_12_FLSA.pdf
[hereinafter April 6, 2006, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter] (describing the test for whether an unpaid participant in
a scholastic externship program is an employee of the sponsoring entity under the FLSA); Fact Sheet #71:
Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t Standards Admin., Wage and
Hour Div. (April 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet
#71] (describing the test for whether an unpaid intern working for a private, “for-profit” entity is an employee
under the FLSA).
62
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000) (declaring that Department of Labor opinion letters,
because they are not subject to notice-and-comment and other rigorous procedural requirements of
Administrative Procedure Act, lack the force of law and are entitled only to limited deference under Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). See also Ramos v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 2005 WL 2405832, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(holding that although Department of Labor fact sheet was not binding upon the court and was “on the low end”
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from satisfaction in assisting students’ career development, is the potential opportunity to screen
future interns or employees. The externs are not guaranteed future internships or employment from
66
their participation in the program.

In its reply letter, the Division, citing Portland Terminal Co.,67 opined that if all of the following
factors are present, “a trainee, intern, extern, apprentice, graduate student, or similar individual” is
not an employee of a sponsoring organization under the FLSA:
1. The training is similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic educational
instruction;
2. The training is for the benefit of the trainees or students;
3. The trainees or students do not displace regular employees, but work under their close
observation;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of
the trainees or students, and on occasion the employer’s operations may actually be impeded;
5. The trainees or students are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training
period; and
6. The employer and the trainees or students understand that the trainees or students are not
68
entitled to wages for the time spent in training.

The Division concluded that under the facts presented, the externs were not employees of
the sponsoring organization because all of its six factors were present in the externship program.69
Proceeding to apply the list of factors to the organization’s operations, the Division explained:
The training the externs receive is a practical application of material taught in a classroom;
therefore, it qualifies as training similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic
educational instruction. The training primarily benefits the students because the students
participate in the program to observe the practical application of the classroom instruction in the
workplace, thus fulfilling the second requirement. The students’ participation for only one week,
the virtual absence of actual work, and the sponsor’s need to assign a shadowed employee means
the sponsor does not receive any tangible benefit and may in fact lose productive work from the
employee assigned to the student, satisfying the fourth requirement. Because the externs “shadow”
an employee, they do not displace any regular employees. Finally, the students are clearly told that
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they will not receive a job at the conclusion of the externship and that they will not receive
70
compensation for the week.

Thus, wrote the Division, the externs are not employees under the Act, and therefore are not
entitled to the Act’s guarantee of a minimum wage.71 In so concluding, the Division stressed that
“[t]his opinion is based exclusively on the facts and circumstances described in your request,” and
added that the “[e]xistence of any other factual or historical background not contained in your
letter might require a conclusion different from the one expressed herein.”72 This warning is not
merely a boilerplate disclaimer attached to the bottom of an opinion letter; rather, it reflects the
centrality of the economic reality test to the entire holistic inquiry of employee status under the
Act. The heavily factual and circumstantial nature of the test means that sponsoring organizations
that employ unpaid interns and externs must carefully examine their own operations and cannot
simply rely upon a blanket assumption that unpaid participants in a university externship program
are not statutory employees as a general proposition.
The April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter draws its reasoning directly from
Portland Terminal Co., which created a narrow exemption from the FLSA’s minimum wage
mandate strictly for the purpose of vocational, “on the job” training solely for the benefit of the
trainee. Thus, the Letter’s factors for FLSA minimum wage exemption for trainees focus heavily
upon the vocational training and educational aspects of the programs that it discusses. Because of
the Act’s uniquely broad ambit of coverage and the historically remedial purposes for which it
was enacted, courts should continue to construe any exemptions to the Act’s coverage narrowly to
discourage employers from improperly taking advantage of unpaid student labor. While the
Division’s April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter opined only about participants in a
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university externship program or in a vocational training program, the Division has also issued
guidance about the employee status of unpaid interns who work for private-sector, “for profit”
organizations independent of a university externship program.
The Division’s Fact Sheet #71,73 distributed in April 2010, provides crucial guidance
about the employee status of unpaid interns for private, “for profit” entities. As in the April 6,
2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, the Division opines both (1) that the determination of
employee status is emphatically a function of facts and circumstances and (2) that, under certain
circumstances, such unpaid interns will not be considered employees under the Act.74 In the Fact
Sheet, the Division articulates a version of the six factors for employee status that subtly but
notably differs from the Wage and Hour Opinion Letter’s version:
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is
similar to training which would be given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close supervision of existing
staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of
the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent
75
in the internship.

Unsurprisingly, the factors described in Fact Sheet #71 are remarkably similar to those
promulgated in the April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter because both closely track the
Court’s decision in Portland Terminal Co.. Notably, however, Fact Sheet #71 differs from the
April 6, 2004, Wage and Hour Opinion Letter because it stresses the first and fourth–educational
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similarity between the internship and a bona fide educational environment and the requirement
that an employer derive no immediate benefit from an intern’s work. The Fact Sheet clarifies that
if the interns are engaged in the operations of the employer or are performing productive work (for
example, filing, performing other clerical work, or assisting customers), then the fact that they
may be receiving some benefits in the form of a new skill or improved work habits will not
exclude them from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements because the employer
benefits from the interns’ work. 76

This clarification underscores the troubling reality of unpaid internships with private employers–
that many unpaid interns routinely perform productive work that directly benefits their employers.
While the characterization of the work of unpaid interns and externs as substantially productive
and directly beneficial to employers is of course debatable, we should more carefully interrogate
the reality of the widespread, normative use of entirely unpaid labor. Certainly there is significant
variation in the quality and quantity of work performed by unpaid interns and externs, but the
FLSA demands (1) that workers be paid a minimum wage by default, (2) that any exceptions be
narrowly construed and individually evaluated with an eye to the remedial purposes of the
minimum wage requirement, and (3) that quality or speed of work is not a factor in determining
entitlement to minimum wage, so there is no defense that an inexperienced novice took too many
hours or generated amateurish work product.
The following Part describes the extraordinarily broad ambit of liability under the FLSA,
which includes both joint liability for joint employers and individual liability for individual actors
who qualify as employers. Additionally, the Act may impose joint liability for third-party
employers who are directly responsible for the violations of other employers. Additionally, the
next Part argues that (1) universities often will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and
externs, and therefore would be jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages; (2) even if universities
are not joint employers under the FLSA, they may be jointly liable as third-party employers who
76
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directly cause minimum wage violations; and (3) a broad class of individuals, including university
administrators and private-sector internship supervisors, may be individually liable for any unpaid
minimum wages.
II.

SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS, UNIVERSITIES, AND INDIVIDUAL EXTERNSHIP PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATORS ARE JOINT EMPLOYERS WHO ARE JOINTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY
LIABLE FOR UNPAID MINIMUM WAGES
The previous Section established the uniquely broad ambit of working relationships

covered by the FLSA. Whether any particular worker is an “employee” under the Act, and
therefore is entitled to a minimum wage for her work, is a facts and circumstances inquiry
governed by the economic reality test. In short, if the economic reality of a working relationship
is that the worker is working under the employer’s supervision for the benefit of the employer,
then that worker is a statutory employee. Although the FLSA makes exemptions for certain types
of employees, and the Department of Labor has issued guidance that certain classes of workers
are not employees if working primarily for their own benefit, these exemptions are narrow, and
the vast majority of working relationships will be covered by the Act.
This Part describes the extraordinarily long reach of liability for damages under the Act.
Liability for unpaid minimum wages under the Act extends to any “employer” of an employee.
Like its definition of “employee,” discussed in the previous Part, the Act’s definition of
“employer” is uniquely broad, and the label potentially extends to a broad range of actors
primarily because of two mechanisms. First, the FLSA imposes joint liability for unpaid wages
upon joint employers of an employee. Because the Act imposes liability for unpaid minimum
wages upon any employer of an employee, liability for those damages can simultaneously extend
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to multiple culpable entities. Second, individual actors can qualify as employers under the Act,
and therefore the Act imposes individual liability upon guilty individuals as well as other entities.
This Part first explains the mechanisms for joint liability for joint employers under the Act.
Second, this Part argues that liability may extend to third-party employers who directly cause a
violation of the FLSA, even if there is no direct or joint employer-employee relationship between
that employer and the aggrieved employee. Third, this Part explains that contrary to normal
notions of limited liability under the corporate structure, liability for unpaid wages extends to
individual persons who qualify as an “employer” by exercising significant control over employees,
regardless of whether the entity is a corporation or not. Fourth, this Part argues that, under the
FLSA, many universities will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs that they
sponsor, and therefore that liability for the unpaid minimum wages of law student externs will
often extend to sponsoring schools in addition to the sponsoring organizations that directly
employ interns and externs. Fifth, this Part argues that, even if universities are not joint employers
under the Act, liability for unpaid wages will often extend to them nonetheless as third-party
employers who directly cause violations of the FLSA. Finally, this Part argues that university
administrators who administer externship programs and internship supervisors are “employers”
under the Act in their individual capacities, and therefore that they should be, and often will be,
individually liable for unpaid wages due to interns and externs.
A. FLSA Imposes Joint Liability for Unpaid Wage Violations upon Joint Employers
The FLSA imposes liability for unpaid minimum wages upon any “employer” of an
employee.77 The Act defines the term broadly to include “any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to the employee.”78 Moreover, as the next Section

77
78

29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a).
29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d) (West 2012).

21

discusses in more detail, the Act further defines “person” to include any “individual,”79 creating
liability for damages for individual natural persons as well as for legal persons. The broad
definition of “employer” means that multiple employers can be liable for the same unpaid
minimum wage damages if the employee is employed by both at the same time. Whether a joint
employment relationship exists among two or more employers and an employee depends on the
facts of each case and is a function of the employee’s working relationship with each employer.80
This Section describes Department of Labor regulations and the leading judicial standard,
expressed in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.,81 for determining whether a joint employment
relationship exists under the Act.
The Department of Labor has helped clarify the circumstances that give rise to a joint
employment relationship by issuing a set of binding regulations called “Joint Employment
Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1979.”82 These regulations set the
responsibilities of joint employers for payment of minimum wages under the Act, and declare that
“if the facts establish that the employee is employed jointly by two or more employers, . . . all of
the employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is considered as one
employment for purposes of the Act.”83 Under these regulations, all joint employers are
“responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of
the [A]ct. . . .”84 Having established general joint and several liability between joint employers for
any violations of the Act, the regulations proceed to identify three more specific situations where
a joint employment relationship will exist:
79
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Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or
works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment
relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as:
(1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee’s services, as, for
example, to interchange employees; or
(2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or
employers) in relation to the employee; or
(3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a
particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by
reason of the fact that one employer controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with
85
the other employer.

Although these regulations described above carry the force of law, few court decisions have relied
upon them to reach a decision about joint employment under the FLSA.86
Rather, courts apply a substantially similar multi-factor test, somewhat akin to the
economic reality test, to determine whether a joint employment relationship exists among an
employee and multiple employers. For decades courts applied a four-factor test initially
developed by the Ninth Circuit in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency.87 However, in
2003 the Second Circuit, calling the Bonnette four-part test “unduly narrow” and holding that it
could not be reconciled with the uniquely expansive definition of “employee” under the FLSA,
developed a new, more expansive six-part test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.88 The Zheng test
for joint employment draws from the reasoning of Rutherford Food Corp., and considers the
following factors: (1) whether the putative joint employer’s premises and equipment are used for
the employee’s work; (2) whether the subcontractor (or the employee’s primary employer,
generally) has a business that can or does shift from one other employer to another; (3) the extent
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to which the workers perform a line job integral to the joint entity’s process of production; (4)
whether responsibility under the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without
material changes; (5) the degree to which the putative joint employer supervises the employee’s
work; and (6) whether the workers work “exclusively or predominantly” for the putative joint
employer.89 Additionally, the test urges district courts to “consider any other factors it deems
relevant to its assessment of the economic realities” of the working relationship.90
In Zheng, the plaintiffs were a group of garment workers directly employed by a small
contractor.91 A much larger garment manufacturer had hired the contractor to work on its garment
manufacturing line, and the workers worked in the manufacturer’s own factory.92 Additionally,
their work was integral to the business operation of the manufacturer, and they worked under the
close supervision of the manufacturer’s inspectors.93 The workers sued the manufacturer for
FLSA violations, claiming that it was a joint employer under the Act.94 Applying the Bonnette
factors,95 a district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, holding that no joint
employment relationship existed.96 The Second Circuit reversed and rejected the Bonnette test,
holding that the manufacturer was a joint employer under the economic reality of the working
relationship, and created the Zheng test. Because the Zheng court was considering joint
employment in the context of garment workers who worked as subcontractors for a manufacturing
company, certain of its factors speak in manufacturing terms, but the precedent, and its broad list
89
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of factors, applies in any employment context. The scope of liability for joint employers is
notably broad under Zheng, and employers may be exposed to liability as joint employers through
a wide variety of working relationships. However, liability for an employee’s unpaid minimum
wages can likely also extend even to an employer who neither directly employs that employee nor
qualifies as a joint employer under Zheng, but rather simply causes another employer’s violation.
B. Joint Liability May Also Extend to a Third-party Employer Who Directly Causes
Another Employer’s FLSA Violation
The scope of liability for joint employers under the FLSA is broad. However, the scope of
liability may be considerably broader yet, extending to employers who, although they do not
directly employ an employee or qualify as a joint employer under the Zheng test, are an employer
who directly causes a violation. The court in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson97 held that in the
Title VII context, an employer can be liable for a violation if it directly causes the violation, even
if that employer does not directly or jointly employ the aggrieved employee. This Section argues
that Sibley’s broad conception of the scope of employer liability under Title VII should also apply
in the FLSA context to properly effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act and to prevent
employers from circumventing employee rights to be paid a minimum wage.
In Sibley, the plaintiff was a male nurse who worked directly for his patients.98 A
nonprofit hospital helped match nurses to their employer patients but did not directly employ the
nurses.99 The nurse sued the hospital that coordinated his patient assignments, alleging that the
hospital had violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination over a period of thirty-four
years by assigning him only to male patients while female nurses routinely worked for both male

97

Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (4th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1339.
99
Id.
98

25

and female patients.100 The hospital moved for summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds,
arguing that it could not be liable for discrimination against the nurse under Title VII because it
was not his employer, and that Title VII liability can only accrue between an employer and an
employee who have a direct employment relationship.101 The district court entered summary
judgment for the nurse because the hospital had not denied any of the nurse’s allegations, but
rather had argued solely that it was not his employer.102
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that Title VII liability is
not limited solely to employers that have a direct employer-employee relationship to an employee,
holding instead that damages “may be available, in an appropriate case, against respondents who
are neither actual nor potential direct employers of particular complainants.”103 Acknowledging
that the nurse and the hospital did not have any direct employment relationship in a traditional
sense, the court nonetheless found dispositive that the hospital did “control the premises upon
which [the nurse’s] services were to be rendered, including [his] access to the patient for purposes
of the initiation of such employment.”104 By discriminatorily intervening between the nurse and
his patient employer, the hospital had exposed itself to Title VII liability.105
The Sibley court’s extension of Title VII liability to an employer that did not have a direct
employment relationship with the complainant was based primarily upon Title VII’s declaration
that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual.”106 The court decided that Title VII’s grant of a cause of action to “any individual”
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rather than to “any employee” meant that the statute did not contemplate that liability could only
accrue if an employer discriminated against an individual whom it directly or prospectively
employed.107 Rather, liability accrues if the person effectuating the discriminatory act is an
employer.108 Additionally, the court examined the policy of Title VII to prevent and remedy
employment discrimination, and concluded that “neither the spirit nor, more essentially, the
language of the Act leave . . . outside the reach of Title VII” liability for a third party
discriminator that is an employer but not the direct employer of the aggrieved party.109 In doing
so, the court prioritized the remedial policy and the anti-discriminatory substance of the Act over
a narrow, mechanistic reading that would have limited the vigor of Title VII.
Courts should extend Sibley’s reasoning to the FLSA context and allow plaintiffs to
recover against third-party employers who cause minimum wage violations even in the absence of
a direct or joint employer-employee relationship. If the Sibley court had held that only direct
employers can be liable for a Title VII violation against an employee, it would have encouraged
employers to limit their Title VII liability by setting up complicated structures that channel claims
of violations to other actors. Such is also the case in the FLSA context; at the very least, extension
of Sibley liability to third-party employers who cause a violation would discourage career
placement services, law school career development offices, and like entities from knowingly
encouraging FLSA violations by placing job seekers in sub-minimum-wage unpaid jobs.
One problem with the argument that Sibley liability should extend to the FLSA context is
that the wording of the FLSA may not allow it. While the Sibley court found especially
dispositive that the text of Title VII forbids “an employer” from discriminating against “any
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individual,”110 the text of the FLSA minimum wage section, 29 U.S.C. § 206, commands that
“[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees . . . not less than the minimum wage.” 111
However, the text of the FLSA “penalties” section arguably extends civil liability to “any
employer” that “violates” the rights of any “employees affected” by declaring that “[a]ny
employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to
the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages.”112
Interpretation of this arguably ambiguous language may be informed by the broader point that the
Sibley court’s reasoning carries over entirely intact. Like the text of Title VII at issue in Sibley,
which creates liability for “an employer” who causes a violation of Title VII, the text of the FLSA
certainly allows for the inference that it should apply to “[e]very employer” who causes a
minimum wage or overtime violation to occur, regardless of whether it directly or jointly employs
the aggrieved party.
Remember that the FLSA defines “employer” broadly as “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”113 Under the reasoning of
Sibley, a third-party who does not have a direct or joint employer-employee relationship with an
employee should still qualify as “an employer” under the FLSA because it is “acting . . .
indirectly in the interest of an employer”114 by facilitating a minimum wage violation. While Part
II.E., infra, argues that universities should be liable for the unpaid minimum wages of their
student interns and externs under Sibley, the next Section describes the individual liability the
FLSA assigns to individual persons who exercise sufficient control over employees.
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C. FLSA Imposes Individual Liability for Unpaid Wage Violations upon Individuals
Who Exercise Sufficient Control Over Employees
As discussed above, the FLSA defines “employer” broadly to include “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”115 “Person” is also
defined notably broadly to include, inter alia, “an individual.”116 Thus, any individual can be
subject to individual liability for a minimum wage violation if he qualifies as an “employer” by
acting in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. The primary consideration
whether an individual will be subject to individual liability under the FLSA is whether the
individual has exerted sufficient control over significant aspects of the employer’s employment
practices, particularly pay.117 In any case, the standard for imposing individual liability under the
FLSA is considerably lower than the veil-piercing requirements required by traditional corporate
law.118 Generally speaking, courts have found employer status for an individual when the
individual has managerial responsibilities and exercises significant control over the terms and
conditions of an employee’s employment.119 Additionally, an individual will qualify as an
employer if that individual has supervisory authority over an employee, is partially or wholly
responsible for the violation, or has control over the employer’s compliance with the FLSA.120
As with all other inquiries of employer and employee status under the FLSA, whether an
individual qualifies as an employer, and therefore is subject to individual liability, is a matter of
115
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facts and circumstances governed by the economic reality of the situation. The following Sections
argue that (1) universities often will qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs that
they sponsor and therefore should be held jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages under the Act;
(2) even if universities are not joint employers under the Act, they should be held liable as thirdparty employers who cause FLSA violations under Sibley; and (3) university administrators and
externship supervisors often will individually qualify as employers because they exercise
significant control over the terms and conditions of the employment of interns and externs.
D. Sponsoring Organizations and Universities Are Joint Employers of Interns and
Externs and Are Jointly Liable for Unpaid Minimum Wages
Universities will often qualify as joint employers of unpaid interns and externs under the
Zheng test because they are FLSA-covered employers who (1) significantly benefit from the work
of unpaid interns and externs, (2) exercise significant control over the terms and conditions of an
unpaid intern or extern’s employment relationship, (3) and furnish the facilities and resources
necessary for the completion of internship work. Universities are FLSA-covered entities per se so
long as they have at least two employees,121 so generally they do not need to satisfy any other
jurisdictional prerequisites to fall under FLSA coverage. Although student interns and externs are
not employees of the universities they attend in a conventional sense, universities should qualify
as joint employers, and therefore be subject to joint liability for unpaid minimum wages, because
they benefit significantly from the unpaid working arrangement with sponsoring organizations
and because they exercise a significant amount of control over almost every aspect of the terms
and conditions of the employment of interns and externs, including, and especially, the decision to
pay the interns no wage.
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Universities significantly benefit from the unpaid work of participants in externship
programs primarily because the operation of an externship program helps to dramatically reduce
the university’s operating costs. The traditional educational model for a university is that students
take classes taught by professors in exchange for school credit. Each professor is paid either a
yearly salary or a per-credit salary based on the number of credits she teaches, and, generally
speaking, each professor is expected to teach some classes each semester. Therefore, ordinarily
the amount of tuition each student pays is directly correlated to the school’s costs of operation via
its faculty salaries – students are expected to take, say, ninety credits over the course of their
education, and the school must pay professors to teach ninety credits per student. Thus is the
traditional model of university education.
However, a school’s decision to offer credits in exchange for participation in an externship
program can dramatically reduce a school’s operating costs. Imagine a university that requires it
students to earn ninety credits to graduate. If half of the university’s students receive six credits
through an externship program over the course of their time at the school, the school can offer 87
rather than 90 credits of classes to each student without increasing its average class size.
Assuming that each credit costs a university the same amount to offer, offering three fewer credits
out of a catalogue of ninety allows a school to save 3.3 percent of its faculty budget.
Universities also exercise significant control over the terms and conditions of student
unpaid externships, primarily because they can refuse to approve the award of credits to
participants in the programs. Many externship programs require participants to have their jobs
pre-approved, and participants must explain the substance of the work they will be performing in
varying levels of detail depending on the university. Furthermore, many schools require
externship program participants to file hour logs and periodically write check-in assignments
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throughout the length of their externships. Because a university can deny credits to externship
participants if it is not satisfied with any of the terms and conditions of the student’s externship–
i.e. the number of hours worked or the substantive character of the work performed–universities
should qualify as joint employers under Zheng.
Finally, universities should qualify as joint employers because they furnish many of the
facilities and resources necessary for an extern’s completion of his unpaid work. For example, in
the context of law school externship programs, many externs continue to use their access to the
Westlaw and LexisNexis research databases, provided by the school ostensibly for academic
purposes, throughout their externships and for the benefit of their employers. Some authors have
suggested that many private sector law firms hire unpaid interns solely for the free access to legal
research databases that students bring with them.122 Additionally, universities offer their library
resources, the expertise of library staff, and library space itself for the unfettered use of students,
many of whom certainly use these resources and facilities to help them complete externship work.
Because many universities benefit significantly and materially from the unpaid work of
their student interns and externs, exercise substantial control over the terms and conditions of the
work of those interns and externs, and furnish resources and facilities necessary for the
completion of externship work, they should be considered joint employers under Zheng, and
therefore jointly liable for unpaid minimum wages. The next Section argues that even if
universities are not joint employers under Zheng, many should be jointly liable regardless under
Sibley as third-party employers who proximately cause FLSA violations.

122
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E. Many Universities May be Liable for Unpaid Minimum Wages under Sibley
Because They Are “An Employer” Who Directly Caused an FLSA Violation
The previous Section argued that many universities are jointly liable for the unpaid
minimum wages of their students who participate in externship programs because they are joint
employers under Zheng. However, even if universities do not qualify as joint employers under
Zheng, many of them should be jointly liable nonetheless under Sibley’s extension of liability to
third-party employers who proximately cause a violation. Although Sibley was a Title VII case,
Part II.B argued that it should also apply in the FLSA context both because the text of the FLSA
allows it and because such an application would effectuate the remedial policy of the Act.
Universities that administer externships that do not qualify for FLSA exemption would be liable
under Sibley because they are FLSA-covered employers who, although not in a direct or joint
employer-employee relationship with their student externs, directly cause FLSA minimum wage
violations by acting as the sole intermediary between unpaid externs and their sponsoring entities,
thereby directly facilitating minimum wage violations.
Universities that administer unpaid externships that violate the minimum wage
requirement are in a remarkably similar position to the defendant hospital in Sibley. In that case,
the hospital was not the plaintiff nurse’s direct employer, but the court found it enough to impose
liability upon the hospital that it did “control the premises upon which [the nurse’s] services were
to be rendered, including [his] access to the patient for purposes of the initiation of such
employment.”123 Like the hospital in that case, universities have absolute control over student
access to the externship employers for whom they work. Without university-administered
externship programs, for-credit unpaid externship jobs would not exist at all. In a very real sense,
universities absolutely control externs’ access to their employers for initiation of their
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employment. Universities do not typically have absolute control over the premises upon which
unpaid externs render their services. However, as the previous Section argued, it is likely that
externs perform a significant portion of their work on school premises and using school resources.
Universities may, and should, be jointly liable for the unpaid minimum wages of any
externship program participants who qualify as “employees” under the FLSA, both as joint
employers under Zheng and as third-party employers who directly cause an FLSA violation under
Sibley. Moreover, because the FLSA imposes individual liability upon any individuals who also
qualify as an “employer” under the FLSA, a significant number of people may also be
individually liable, including university administrators and extern supervisors.
F. Many University Externship Program Administrators and Other Individuals Should
Be Individually Liable for the Unpaid Minimum Wages of Interns and Externs
Because the FLSA imposes individual liability upon any individual who qualifies as an
employer, broadly defined as any person who acts in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee, the class of people potentially individually liable for unpaid minimum wages of interns
and externs is large. Generally speaking, individuals will be subject to individual liability if they
exert significant control over an employer’s employment practices, particularly pay; if they
exercise managerial authority over employees; if they are personally responsible for the violation;
or if they are responsible for the employer’s general compliance with the FLSA. In the context of
unpaid interns and externs who work for private-sector employers, two classes of people may be
subject to individual liability: (1) university officials who administer illegal externship programs
and other school officials significantly involved in the decision to sponsor illegally unpaid
internships and externships, and (2) individuals responsible for hiring and supervising unpaid
interns and externs at their sponsoring employers.
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University officials who administer externship programs that place interns and externs in
illegally unpaid jobs may be subject to individual liability under the FLSA because they exercise
managerial authority over externs and they are significantly responsible for the university’s
continued FLSA violations. In many externship programs, such administrators exercise
managerial authority over externs by having the ultimate discretion whether to award school
credit. Additionally, externship program administrators have significant managerial authority over
the terms and conditions of an extern’s employment such that they act as de facto supervisors. For
example, in many externship programs administrators must approve the number of hours an
extern will work, who will supervise the extern, and exactly what types of work the extern will be
doing before she can even begin the externship. Such involvement in the terms and conditions of
the extern’s employment, coupled with the administrator’s ultimate authority to decide whether
the extern will receive credit, means that externship program administrators may be individually
liable for any illegal unpaid externships that they oversee.
In addition to university officials who actively administer externship programs, school
administrative officials who approve the existence and maintenance of illegal externship
programs, such as law school deans, may also be subject to individual liability under the Act.
High-ranking university officials are partially responsible for university FLSA compliance, and
their decisions to maintain the existence of such programs directly affect the pay (or lack thereof)
of many student participants. Like CEOs and company presidents who have been held
individually liable for widespread FLSA violations at their companies, higher-ranking university
administrators may be subject to individual liability for widespread violations at their universities.
Finally, supervisors of illegally unpaid interns and externs may be held individually liable
for FLSA violations if they are significantly involved in hiring and the decision to pay zero wages
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to interns and externs. Such supervisors are likely to have significant authority over the
substantive terms and conditions of an extern’s employment. Moreover, supervisors and those in
charge of hiring are directly complacent in violations by being personally involved in the day to
day work of unpaid employees. Of course, like the holistic inquiry of employer status under the
FLSA, whether any particular individual will be held individually liable is a function of facts and
circumstances, but any individual who falls within the FLSA’s uniquely broad definition of
“employer” will be individually liable for damages if the unpaid internship or externship does
violate the FLSA.
CONCLUSION
Unpaid internships and externships are a commonplace–almost ubiquitous–experience for
many university students and younger workers. Opinions about the morality, usefulness, and
educational value of such unpaid jobs vary considerably, but the legality of such unpaid jobs is far
from clear. This Article has argued that many unpaid internships and externships for private
employers actually violate the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Universities that sponsor externship programs and private-sector employers that hire unpaid
interns and externs should carefully evaluate the unpaid jobs that they offer, lest they be exposed
to potentially considerable liability for unpaid minimum wages.
This Article has further argued that universities that administer externship programs may
be, and should be, jointly liable for any damages due to unpaid interns and externs that they
sponsor, both as joint employers and as third-party employers that directly cause and facilitate
FLSA violations. Furthermore, a broad class of individuals may be individually liable for the
illegally unpaid minimum wages of interns and externs. Some such individuals include university
administrators, particularly externship programs administrators and deans, and individuals who
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supervise and hire unpaid interns at their private-sector jobs. The goal of this Article is to
encourage employers to pay interns and externs a fair wage for their work. Additionally, this
Article encourages universities to more carefully examine the educational value–and morality–of
the unpaid internships and externships that they sponsor, so that they can ensure that students who
work for no wages will have a genuinely edifying, educational experience rather than simply
serve as a source of free labor.

